## **Community resources**

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## **Viewing cable 09BERN350, SWISS REACTION TO UBS AGREEMENT \**

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the <u>structure of a cable</u> as well as how to <u>discuss them</u> with others. See also the <u>FAQs</u>

## **Understanding cables**

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<u>browse by origin</u> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this <u>WikiSource</u> article as reference.

## **Discussing cables**

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BERN350.

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

09BERN350 2009-08-20 15:10 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bern

Appears in these articles:

http://www.letemps.ch/swiss papers

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VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSW #0350/01 2321510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201510Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6015
INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
2009-08-20 15:10:00 09BERN350 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 09BERN68 VZCZCXYZ0000\
RR RUEHWEB\
DE RUEHSW #0350/01 2321510\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
R 201510Z AUG 09\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6015\
INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC\
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC\
 CONFIDENTIAL BERN 000350 \
SIPDIS \
DEPT OF JUSTICE FOR B.SWARTZ,
L/EB FOR K.KIZER AND W.TEEL \
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2019 \
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SUBJECT: SWISS REACTION TO UBS AGREEMENT \
REF: BERN 68 \
Classified By: DCM L.Carter for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). \
\P1. (C) Summary. President and Finance Minister Hans-Rudolf \setminus
Merz, Justice Minister Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, and Foreign \
Affairs Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey in an August 19 press \backslash conference praised the UBS agreement as the only possible \backslash
solution and a "Peace Treaty." The Ministers were quick to \
limit the reach of the agreement to UBS only, although the \
Justice Minister recognized the agreement could open the door \ for similar requests from other Swiss banks if those banks \
committed similar egregious acts like UBS. Media \
commentators and political pundits covered a range of \
opinions from declaring the agreement a true victory for the \ U.S. to an absolute win for Switzerland. Unlike the media, \
local business leaders and the Swiss Bankers Association \
universally expressed relief that the UBS case was resolved. \
The UBS case had been a dark cloud over bilateral relations, \
with concerns it could escalate to a seriously damaging event \
similar to the Holocaust asset case a decade ago. Current \
Swiss opinion indicates, however, that the agreement will \setminus
mollify all but the most anti-American voices and leave our \
bilateral relations relatively unscathed. End Summary. \
FEDERAL COUNCILLORS PRAISE RESOLUTION, GOOD BILATERAL \
RELATIONS \
----- \
12. (U) President and Finance Minister Hans-Rudolf Merz, \
Justice Minister Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, and Foreign Affairs \
Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey discussed the resolution of the \
UBS case in a press conference on August 19. Widmer-Schlumpf \
touted the bilateral agreement as the only possible solution. \
 She commented that it was necessary to preserve the Swiss \
legal system against the unilateral enforcement of US \
regulations, which could include freezing UBS' US-based \ assets. Calmy-Rey called the agreement a "Peace Treaty" and \
praised the good Swiss connections with the US for making the \
agreement possible. While President Merz emphasized that the \
agreement only applied to the specific case of UBS, Widmer- \
Schlumpf countered that the tax treaty language "tax fraud \ and the like" coupled with the recently adopted OECD \
standards for administrative assistance could open the door \
for similar requests for information from other Swiss banks \
if those banks had committed similar egregious acts like UBS. \
President Merz, who previously expressed regret at UBS' \ unacceptable actions (reftel), appealed to Swiss banks to \
respect U.S. laws and the Qualified Intermediary regulations. \
NO CLEAR TREND IN MEDIA OPINIONS \
\P3. (U) Media commentators and political pundits covered a \setminus
range of opinions from declaring the agreement a true victory \
for the U.S. to an absolute win for Switzerland. Neither the \
political persuasion of the papers nor the region of the \
country defined a clear Swiss opinion about the effects of \
the agreement. Newspaper articles ranged from claiming the \broader interpretation of "tax fraud and the like" in the tax \
agreement was the "last nail in the coffin of banking \
secrecy" to citing legal experts that announced Switzerland \
had been the clear winner because Switzerland's legal \ procedures had not been compromised. Another paper took a \ completely different approach arguing that even though the \
agreement was the only tenable solution, it placed undue \
pressure on Switzerland's governmental system of separation \
of powers between the Federal Council and the Tax \
Administration Court. \
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BUSINESS RELIEVED BY AGREEMENT
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- 14. (C) Unlike the media, business leaders universally \
  expressed relief that the UBS case was resolved. Swiss \
  American Chamber of Commerce CEO Martin Naville told econoff \
  that the agreement was a positive outcome for two reasons: 1) \
  the agreement was signed under a partnership spirit without \
  the adversarial tone expressed in previous months; and 2) the \
  exchange of information will be in accordance with the double \
  taxation treaty. He highlighted that political will to \
  ratify the recently revised treaty would not exist if the IRS \
  did not conform to the requirements of the original treaty. \
  Naville expected there to be some domestic policy noise about \
  Switzerland relinquishing its sovereignty and its tradition \
  of bank secrecy, but these opinions would not cloud the \
  positive impact of the resolution. \
- 15. (C) Thomas Pletscher, Executive Board Member of \
  EconomieSuisse, Switzerland's largest umbrella organization \
  for Swiss business and industry, echoed Naville's sentiments \
  calling the agreement a "relief." Pletscher stated that the \
  overall industry response had been positive. He told econoff \
  that a long drawn out court case posed "a danger of \
  overshadowing" and "seriously damaging" otherwise good \
  bilateral relations. In addition, the agreement established \
  a procedure to avoid a clash of the two countries' legal \
  frameworks. Pletscher was not concerned about the agreement \
  breaching Switzerland's banking secrecy. He stated that the \
  agreement marked the "end of Hollywood's version of banking \
  secrecy" which was always an inaccurate portrayal. Banking \
  secrecy was designed to protect individual privacy, not to \
  hide criminal conduct. \
- 16. (C) The Swiss Bankers Association's Head of U.S. Affairs \ Heinreich Siegmann reiterated the relief that the complicated \ matter had been resolved amicably and within the Swiss legal \ framework. Siegmann informed econoff that maintaining the \ stability of Swiss law was crucial to the continuing success \ of the Swiss financial center. \

\ -----\ COMMENT \

17. (C) Post expects that the UBS case will provide the \Swiss media fodder for claiming the U.S. bullied Switzerland \into an agreement that marks the demise of banking secrecy, a \national heritage. However, Swiss government and business \leaders generally view the agreement as a mutual compromise \that protects Swiss sovereignty while enabling the U.S. to \enforce its tax laws. The UBS case was a dark cloud over \bilateral relations, with concerns it could escalate to a \seriously damaging event similar to the Holocaust asset case \a decade ago. Current Swiss opinion indicates, however, that \the agreement will mollify all but the most anti-American \voices and leave our bilateral relations relatively unscathed. \BEYER \